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DEBT, DEFICITS AND FINITE HORIZONS:
THE STOCHASTIC CASE
ROGER E.A. FARMER, CARINE NOURRY, AND ALAIN VENDITTI
Abstract. We introduce aggregate uncertainty and complete markets into Blan-
chard’s (1985) perpetual youth model. We show how to construct a simple formula
for the pricing kernel in terms of observable aggregate variables. We study a pure
trade version of our model and we show it behaves much like the two-period over-
lapping generations model. Our methods are easily generalized to economies with
production and they should prove useful to researchers who seek a tractable sto-
chastic model in which fiscal policy has real effects on aggregate allocations.
I. Introduction
For the past twenty years macroeconomists have used the Real Business Cycle
model (RBC) to study stochastic fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. In
that model, an infinitely lived family makes decisions for all subsequent generations.
The model is elegant and simple and captures many of the features of real world
business cycles but it has strong properties that follow from the representative agent
assumption. Among them: 1) the real interest rate in the long run is pinned down
by the representative agent’s rate of time preference, 2) an expansionary fiscal policy
in the form of a tax financed transfer has no first order effects on aggregate economic
activity and 3) in a model of multiple infinitely lived agents with time separable
preferences the income distribution is degenerate.
Paul Samuelson (1958) proposed an alternative ‘overlapping generations’ model
(OG) in which a sequence of overlapping finitely lived agents trade with each other.
In Samuelson’s original paper there were three generations of agents. It has since been
extended to multiple generations and has been used to study optimal fiscal policy
(Diamond 1965), intergenerational transfers (Kotlikoff and Summers 1981) and social
security policy (Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines 1999). Long lived versions of
Date: November 25, 2009.
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the model have been analyzed computationally by Rios-Rull (1996) and the dynamics
of the two-period version have been analyzed by David Gale (1973).
The overlapping generations model has very different properties from that of the
representative agent model but it does not lend itself to empirical work because
realistically calibrated versions of the model are described by very high order difference
equations. To circumvent this problem, Olivier Blanchard (1985) and Philippe Weil
(1989) have studied a model populated by a measure of long-lived agents that die, and
are replaced, with a fixed probability that is independent of age. This perpetual youth
model combines features of the representative agent model with the OG framework
in a tractable way and versions of the model have been used to study a variety of
issues in macroeconomics.
The purpose of this paper is to extend Blanchard’s analysis to the stochastic dis-
crete time case by studying a pure trade version of the perpetual youth model with
aggregate endowment shocks. We introduce a technique for solving the model in
the presence of a complete set of securities and we show that it behaves much like
the two-period model studied by David Gale (1973). Although our focus is on solu-
tion methods, our results should be of interest to researchers interested in analytic
methods for studying the impact of fiscal policy in stochastic overlapping generations
models both with and without production.
II. Relationship to the Literature
Our paper is connected to two distinct literatures. Beginning with Cass and Shell’s
(1983) work on sunspot equilibria, a body of work developed on determinacy in over-
lapping generations models with and without complete markets. Some early examples
from this extensive literature include Farmer and Woodford (1984) and Spear (1985).
Other papers including Zilcha (1991), Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999), Chat-
topadhyay (2005) and Bloise and Calciano (2008) have studied optimality in these
models.
Cass and Shell (1983) exploited an equivalence between a model with a complete
set of Arrow securities and a model with complete contingent commodities to estab-
lish the existence of sunspot equilibria. Following work on spanning by Duffy and
Huang (1985), Talmain (1999) has studied the number of assets needed to span the
commodity space in a two period overlapping generations model. This is the closest
paper to our own in this literature although Talmain’s work, like all of the other
papers we have cited, deals with finite horizon agents.
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Our paper is connected to a second literature that developed from the perpetual
youth model of Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989). That model forms the core of
a recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, that formulates and estimates
macroeconomic models in which fiscal policy matters. It includes papers by Ghironi
(2003), Ganelli (2003; 2005), Botman et. al. (2006) and Farmer (2009). The device
of assuming long-lived agents who die with fixed probability is a useful one because
it allows the researcher to construct tractable models in which Ricardian equivalence
(see Barro (1974)) breaks down and fiscal transfers have real effects.
But although the perpetual youth model is tractable, the versions that have been
worked out in the existing literature, do not allow for aggregate shocks. Empirical
work based on this model must add shocks to the linearized non-stochastic model.
That is an unsatisfying and ad hoc solution since the way that aggregate uncertainty
enters the model could potentially affect the behavior of the aggregate equations.
Even if a first order approximation works well, there is no guidance from the non
stochastic model on how to incorporate second order effects that one would need
to study interactions between aggregate quantities and risk spreads. In the current
paper, we show how to construct the pricing kernel in a pure trade model with long-
lived perpetual youth consumers with logarithmic preferences and aggregate shocks.
In future work we plan to extend our results to a wider class of preferences and to
embed our results in a production economy.
III. The Model
We assume that a new cohort of individuals is born each period. Agents die with
fixed probability which is independent of age. This important assumption implies
that all agents discount the future in the same way and it leads to a single concept of
aggregate human wealth that greatly simplifies the structure of the set of competitive
equilibria.
Each household survives into the subsequent period with a fixed probability pi and
every period a proportion (1−pi) of households dies. At the beginning of each period,
households have n children. It follows that if Nt is the number of agents alive at date
t then
Nt+1 = (pi + n)Nt (1)
is the number of agents alive at date t+1. Depending on whether pi+n is greater or
smaller than one, the total population will increase or decrease over time. We assume
that pi + n > 1 and we normalize the initial population to one, N0 = 1.
DEBT, DEFICITS AND FINITE HORIZONS: THE STOCHASTIC CASE 4
The combination of birth and death processes implies that at any point in time
there are (pi + n)t agents alive of whom pi(pi+ n)t−1 are “old", i.e. survivors from the
previous period t− 1, and n(pi + n)t−1 are “young”, i.e. newly born in period t.
The per-period utility function of the agents is logarithmic. For a typical agent i,
utility at date t is given by the expression
U it = log(c
i
t). (2)
We consider an exchange economy with a single consumption commodity and sto-
chastic endowments in which uncertainty unfolds in a sequence of periods. Uncer-
tainty each period is indexed by a finite set of states S = {S1, . . . , Sn}. Define the set
of t-period histories St recursively as follows:
S1 = S
St = St−1 × S, t = 2, . . .
(3)
The households in this economy trade a complete set of Arrow securities. Let
Qτt (S
τ ) represent the price of the security that pays one unit of the consumption
commodity if and only if history Sτ ∈ Sτ occurs at date τ . Using this notation
Qt+1t (S
′) is the price of an Arrow security. This is a claim, sold at date t, to one unit
of the consumption good for delivery at date t+ 1 if and only if state S ′ occurs. Let
the probability that S ′ occurs at date t + 1 be given by p(S ′) and assume that this
probability is independent of time.
Each period t, the agents of household i receive an endowment wit(S) if state S ∈ S
is realized. They purchase consumption commodities cit(S) and they accumulate a
portfolio of the n securities ait+1(S
′), where there is one security for each of the values
of S ′.
Since the household may not survive into period t+1, we assume, as in Blanchard
(1985), that there exists an actuarially fair annuities market. The existence of this
market implies that the household pays price piQt+1t (S
′) for a claim to one unit of
consumption in period t+ 1 if and only if state S ′ occurs and the household is alive.
We assume that this security is issued by a competitive annuity sector that earns
zero profit in equilibrium. If the household dies, its claim reverts to the company
that issued the annuity. We will describe the balance sheet of this sector in Section
V.
Given our assumptions, the representative family born in period h faces the follow-
ing sequence of budget constraints,∑
S′∈S
piQt+1t (S
′)ait+1(S
′) = ait(S) + w
i
t(S)− c
i
t(S), t = h . . .∞, (4)
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together with the set of no-Ponzi scheme conditions,
lim
T→∞
piT−hQTh (S
T )aih(S
T ) ≥ 0, for all ST ∈ ST , (5)
one for every possible history that might occur. These constraints imply that the
household must plan to remain solvent in every possible history. The term ait+1(S
′) is
the quantity of security S ′ purchased for price piQt+1t (S
′) at date t. The terms ait(S)
and wit(S) on the right side of (9) are respectively the sole security that has positive
value at date t and the endowment received at date t if state S is realized. cit(S) is
the household’s purchase of consumption commodities.
The human wealth of household i is defined recursively by the equation,
hit(S) = w
i
t(S) +
∑
S′∈S
piQt+1t (S
′)hit+1(S
′). (6)
By iterating this expression it follows that, as long as human wealth is finite,
hit(S) =
∞∑
τ=t
[
piτ−t
∑
Sτ∈Sτ
Qτt (S
τ )wiτ (S
τ)
]
. (7)
The assumption that human wealth is finite requires that
lim
T→∞
piT−hQTh (S
T )wih(S
T ) = 0, for all ST ∈ ST . (8)
In a representative agent model with no uncertainty and a constant growth rate
of endowments, a condition like this implies that the interest rate must exceed the
growth rate. Our condition is weaker. In the perpetual youth model the household
values future assets using the factor piQt+1t instead of Q
t+1
t reflecting the fact that it
may not survive into the subsequent period and this fact implies that the perpetual
youth model may display inefficient equilibria in which the interest rate is less than
the growth rate.
Equations (4) – (8) can be combined to write a single budget constraint for the
household,
∞∑
τ=t
[
piτ−t
∑
Sτ∈Sτ
Qτt (S
τ )ciτ (S
τ )
]
≤ hit(S) + a
i
t(S). (9)
A representative family maximizes the following intertemporal stream of discounted
utilities
Et
{
+∞∑
τ=t
(piβ)τ−tlog(ciτ (S
τ ))
}
(10)
subject to the budget constraint (9), where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The first
order condition for this maximization program is given by the following set of first
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order conditions, one for each of the n states S ′ ∈ S,
Qt+1t (S
′)cit+1(S
′) = βcit(S)p(S
′). (11)
Recall that p(S ′) is the probability that state S ′ occurs. As is well-known, with a
logarithmic utility function, the solution to the household’s problem is given by the
following policy function
cit(S) = (1− βpi)
(
ait(S) + h
i
t(S)
)
. (12)
This equation instructs the household, in the optimal plan, to consume a fixed fraction
of wealth each period.
IV. Defining Aggregate Variables
The equilibrium of the perpetual youth model is complicated. The economy con-
tains an infinite number of agents indexed by date of birth and each of these agents
takes decisions based on the realization of uncertainty at the date he was born. As
with all long-lived generations models, a complete description of the equilibrium re-
quires that one keep track of the wealth distribution across agents and, in this model,
the wealth distribution is an infinite dimensional object.
Blanchard made two assumptions that simplify the description of equilibrium.
First, preferences are logarithmic.1 Second, all agents die with the same probabil-
ity that is independent of age. These assumptions imply that consumption is linear
in wealth and they allow one to derive a simple set of equations in the aggregate state
variables that completely characterizes their behavior. Our contribution in this paper
is to extend this idea to the case of aggregate uncertainty by assuming the existence
of a complete set of Arrow securities.
To describe an equilibrium, our first task is to define a set of aggregate state vari-
ables. For this purpose we will divide the population into two groups that correspond
roughly to the young and the old in a standard two-period overlapping generations
model.
LetAt be the index set of all agents that are alive at date t. Recall that a proportion
pi of these agents will survive into period t + 1. Similarly, let Nt+1 denote the set of
newborns at period t+1. For any date t+1 and any variable x let xit be the quantity
1This assumption can be extended to homothetic preferences with some additional algebra. We
have not pursued that complication here since it considerably increases the complexity of the math-
ematics needed to characterize an equilibrium.
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of that variable held by household i and let xt be the aggregate quantity. Then,
pi
∑
i∈At
xit+1 +
∑
i∈Nt+1
xit+1 =
∑
i∈At+1
xit+1 = xt+1. (13)
Notice that At+1 6= At ∪ Nt+1 as (1 − pi)Nt agents die at the end of period t while
nNt agents are born at the beginning of period t+ 1.
Equation (13) says that any aggregate variable x can be defined as the sum over
groups of people in two different ways. We can add up xi over everyone who was alive
yesterday and add it to the sum over everyone who is born today. Or we can add up
xi over everyone who is alive today. Using this notation, define At, Wt, Ct and Ht as
follows,
At =
∑
i∈At
ait, Wt =
∑
i∈At
wit, Ct =
∑
i∈At
cit, Ht =
∑
i∈At
hit. (14)
We also define each of these variables in per capita terms,
at =
At
Nt
, wt =
Wt
Nt
, ct =
Ct
Nt
, ht =
Ht
Nt
, (15)
where Nt evolves according to Equation (1).
V. Government, Life Insurance and Annuities
We assume the existence of a competitive annuities sector that issues Arrow se-
curities as liabilities. Here, we describe how this sector operates. Each period, the
annuities sector issues a set of n securities. Security S ′ is sold to the household sector
for price piQt+1t (S
′). In addition to these assets, we assume the existence of a gov-
ernment that issues debt Bt+1 in the form of pure discount bonds. Bt+1 is a claim
to Bt+1 units of the consumption good at date t + 1 in every state of nature. The
assumption of no riskless arbitrage implies that a claim of this kind will sell for price
Qt+1t in period t where,
Qt+1t =
∑
S′∈S
Qt+1t (S
′). (16)
We will study the case where Bt+1 may be positive (the government is in debt) or
negative (the government owns claims on the private sector). Note that debt of this
kind is conceptually distinct from the ‘money’ of Samuelson’s (1958) paper since it is
denominated in units of consumption. It represents an indexed bond.
We will take the initial value of debt as given: It may be positive or negative. We
will study policies in which the debt is rolled over from one period to the next with
neither taxation nor government purchases of commodities. We leave these additional
features for future work.
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VI. Equilibrium Relationships Between Aggregate Variables
In this section we put together the behavioral relationships and our definitions to
derive a set of equations that will hold, in equilibrium, between the per capita debt
bt = Bt/Nt, Q
t+1
t (S
′), wt(S), at(S) and ht(S). We begin with government policy.
The assumption that government rolls over its debt in each period implies that
debt each period is described by the following difference equation,2
Bt+1
∑
S′
Qt+1t (S
′) = Bt. (17)
It follows from Equations (1) and (17) that
(pi + n)bt+1
∑
S′
Qt+1t (S
′) = bt. (18)
Next we turn to human wealth. We will derive a recursive expression for aggregate
human wealth that is similar to Equation (6), the expression for individual human
wealth. We arrive at this expression by summing Equation (6) over the set At of
agents alive at date t. The derivation is in Appendix A.
ht(S) = wt(S) + pi
∑
S′
Qt+1(S
′)ht+1(S
′). (19)
Now consider the relationship between per capita consumption and wealth. Using
the equilibrium on the asset market as given by∑
i∈At
ait(S) = Bt (20)
it follows from summing Equation (12) over all agents alive at date t that
ct(S) = (1− βpi) (bt + ht(S)) . (21)
Using the market clearing condition, this expression implies,
wt(S) = (1− βpi) (bt + ht(S)) . (22)
Finally, we seek an equation that describes the price of an Arrow security as a
function of wt and ht. In a representative agent model we could find an expression
for this price by taking the ratio of aggregate consumption at two different dates.
Something similar will work here, but we need to account for changes in the set
2Note that this equation can also be obtained as the aggregation of the households’ budget
constraints (4).
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of agents over time. Appendix A shows how to derive the following expression for
Qt+1t (S
′).
Qt+1t (S
′) =
piβwt(S)p(S
′)
(pi + n)wt+1(S ′)− (1− βpi)nht+1(S ′)
. (23)
VII. Solving the Model
In this section we write down equations in two different state variables. Either of
these representations can be used to characterize the properties of equilibria. Our
first variable is the ratio of human wealth to the endowment. We call this zt(S) and
we define it as,
zt(S) =
ht(S)
wt(S)
. (24)
To derive a dynamic expression in zt(S), we first combine Equations (19) and (23),
to give,
ht(S) = wt(S) + βpi
2wt(S)
∑
S′
ht+1(S
′)p(S ′)
(pi + n)wt+1(S ′)− (1− βpi)nht+1(S ′)
. (25)
Dividing this expression through by wt(S) gives the expression we seek,
zt(S) = 1 + βpi
2
∑
S′
zt+1(S
′)p(S ′)
pi + n− (1− βpi)nzt+1(S ′)
. (26)
We can also write the right hand side as an expectation,
zt(S) = 1 + βpi
2Et
[
zt+1(S
′)
pi + n− (1− βpi)nzt+1(S ′)
]
. (27)
Next, we turn to an equivalent expression to characterize equilibria using govern-
ment debt as a state variable. Substituting equation (23) into equation (18), we
obtain the following expression,
(pi + n)βpiwt(S)bt+1
∑
S′
p(S ′)
(pi + n)wt+1(S ′)− (1− βpi)nht+1(S ′)
= bt. (28)
Now use Equation (22) to write human wealth as a function of debt,
ht+1(S
′) =
wt+1(S
′)
1− βpi
− bt+1, (29)
and substitute this into (28) to give the equation we seek,
bt = (pi + n)βpiwt(S)bt+1Et
[
1
piwt+1(S ′) + (1− βpi)nbt+1
]
. (30)
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VIII. Deterministic Dynamics
Although we are ultimately interested in the stochastic properties of the model, we
turn first to the special case when there is no aggregate uncertainty by setting wt(S) =
w for any date t and any state S. This special assumption leads to the following non-
stochastic difference equation in zt which characterizes feasible sequences of human
wealth in a competitive equilibrium.
zt = 1 +
zt+1βpi
2
pi + n− (1− βpi)nzt+1
, (31)
z1 =
1
1− βpi
−
b
w1
, (32)
where b is initial government debt.
We can also state this an equation that uses debt as the state variable,
bt =
(pi + n)βpiwbt+1
piw + (1− βpi)nbt+1
, (33)
b1 = b. (34)
Solving (31) at the steady state zt = z yields the following second degree polynomial
z2 − z
[
pi + n
n
+
1
1− βpi
]
+
pi + n
n(1− βpi)
= 0, (35)
which has two distinct steady states
z1 =
pi + n
n
and z2 =
1
1− βpi
. (36)
Solving Equation (33) at the steady state bt = b yields also two distinct values which
are associated with the steady state values of z1 and z2:
b1 =
piw[β(pi + n)− 1]
n(1− βpi)
and b2 = 0. (37)
Finally, we derive from equation (23) evaluated along a deterministic path two
associated values for the price of the Arrow securities at the steady state, namely:
Q1 =
1
pi + n
and Q2 = β. (38)
We state these results as a proposition,
Proposition 1. In the deterministic version of this economy with wt(S) = w for any
date t and any state S, there exist two distinct steady states for (z, b, Q) such that
(z1, b1, Q1) =
(
pi + n
n
,
piw[β(pi + n)− 1]
n(1− βpi)
,
1
pi + n
)
, (39)
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and
(z2, b2, Q2) =
(
1
1− βpi
, 0, β
)
. (40)
Recall that the equilibrium gross rate of interest is given by R = 1
Q
. It follows that
the interest factors in these two steady state equilibria are such that:
R1 =
1
Q1
= pi + n and R2 =
1
Q2
=
1
β
. (41)
Since n+pi > 1, by assumption, the gross interest rate in both steady state equilibria
is positive and the wealth of each household is well defined. Notice however, that if
1/β < pi+n, the second of these steady state equilibria is dynamically inefficient with
R2 < pi + n.
David Gale (1973) studied dynamics of a two period model with a government
liability that he called money. His model led to a difference equation that is very
similar to the one that we have derived for the perpetual youth model. Following Gale
we refer to steady state 1 as the golden rule steady state since it has the property
that the interest rate paid by households is equal to the population growth rate. We
refer to steady state 2 as the autarkic steady state since it has the property that
each household will choose to consume its endowment in equilibrium and there is no
inter-generational borrowing or lending.
The steady state value for government debt at the golden rule, b1, can be positive or
negative depending on whether 1
β
is larger or lower than pi+n. David Gale suggested
the following classification. An economy where 1
β
> pi + n is called classical. An
economy for which 1
β
< pi+n is called Samuelson. In a classical economy the autarkic
steady state is dynamically efficient with an interest rate that exceeds the growth
rate. In a Samuelson economy the autarkic steady state is dynamically inefficient
with an interest rate that is less than the growth rate.3 In a classical economy, steady
state debt is negative at the golden rule. In a Samuelson economy it is positive.
The sign of government debt at the golden rule has implications for the local sta-
bility properties of the respective steady states. Consider the difference equation (33)
which can be restated as a backward-looking difference equation as follows:
bt+1 =
piwbt
(pi + n)βpiw − (1− βpi)nbt
≡ g(bt). (42)
Differentiating with respect to bt, it follows that g
′(b1) = β(pi + n) and g
′(b2) =
1/[β(pi + n)]. We use this result to state Proposition 2:
3Gale chose this terminology because dynamic inefficiency is a novel feature that arises in Samuel-
son’s overlapping generations model but is absent from classical infinite horizon models with a rep-
resentative agent.
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Proposition 2. In the deterministic version of our model, with wt(S) = w for any date
t and any state S, the following results hold:
i) When the autarkic interest rate is less than the population growth rate, ( 1
β
<
pi+n), the golden rate steady state, b1 > 0, is locally unstable and the autarkic steady
state, b2 = 0, is locally stable. In this case autarky is both stable and dynamically
inefficient.
ii) When the autarkic interest rate is greater than the population growth rate,
( 1
β
> pi + n), the golden rule steady state, b1 < 0, is locally stable and the autarkic
steady state, b2 = 0 is locally unstable. In this case autarky is both dynamically
efficient and unstable.
What does it mean for a steady state equilibrium to be stable? Recall that we
have interpreted debt as an indexed bond. It follows that stability of a steady state
equilibrium implies that, locally, there will exist initial values for government debt
for which a policy of rolling over the debt is feasible and leads to a sequence for
government debt that converges to the steady state.
If the world is Samuelson – there is a feasible policy that rolls over the debt each
period. Government debt as a fraction of gdp will shrink over time as the economy
grows faster than the interest rate. This policy will have bad outcomes since it causes
the economy to converge to a dynamically inefficient steady state. In this world, there
is a Pareto improving policy; it is a once off transfer to existing agents, financed by
debt, that takes the economy to the golden rule steady state and leaves it there.
If the world is classical, a policy in which the debt is rolled over every period is
infeasible. It leads to an explosive sequence of debt and, eventually, taxes will need
to be raised to restore stability. In this world, there is no Pareto improving policy
since equilibria are efficient. There is however, a policy that raises the welfare of
all future generations at a small cost to the current generation. By taxing a small
amount from existing households and lending the money back to households, the
government can select an equilibrium with b < 0 that converges to a golden rule
steady state. In that steady state the government holds claims of b1, a negative
number, and every household receives a lump sum transfer each period, paid for by
the interest on government assets.
In David Gales’s (1973) analysis of a two-period model similar to ours, he interprets
debt as a nominal variable. Under that interpretation of our model, the initial value,
b is not pinned down since the initial price level is free. In that case, there is a
connection between stability of the steady state and determinacy of equilibrium. If
an equilibrium is unstable, it is locally determinate since there is a unique initial
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condition associated with a path for the state variable that converges to the steady
state. If the steady state is stable, it is locally indeterminate.
Local indeterminacy implies that there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths
converging toward the same steady state. Since the price level is free, the initial value
of debt is not given and Proposition 2 implies that there exists an equilibrium path
from each admissible value for the initial debt converging either to b2 = 0 or to b1 < 0
depending on whether β(pi + n) is larger or lower than 1.
Figure 1. Equilibrium in the Samuelson Case
Figure 2. Equilibrium in the Classical Case
In a Samuelson economy in which bt is interpreted as a nominal variable, there is a
one parameter family of perfect-foresight equilibria converging asymptotically to the
zero debt steady state. At this steady state households can borrow and lend at an
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interest rate of 1/β (see Figure 1). The only perfect foresight equilibrium converging
to the positive debt golden rule steady state, is the one that begins with a price level
that exactly supports that steady state as an equilibrium.
In a classical economy in which bt is interpreted as a nominal variable, there exists
an unstable (determinate) no-debt steady state, and a stable (indeterminate) negative
debt steady state. Any initial interest rate, different from 1/β, generates a perfect
foresight equilibrium converging to the negative-debt steady state equilibrium (see
Figure 2).
IX. Stochastic Dynamics: the Case of Indexed Debt
Equation (30) must hold each period in any rational-expectation equilibrium. To
parameterize uncertainty we assume that wt is i.i.d., and drawn each period from
a distribution F (w) with bounded support [1, w¯]. We assume further that F (w) is
common knowledge. We normalize the lower bound of the support to unity since it
simplifies some algebra in the proofs.
To analyze equilibria of the stochastic model, we will consider two cases. Suppose
first that debt is denominated in units of the consumption commodity and that the
economy begins with per-capita debt of b which may be positive or negative. In
this case, since debt is chosen at date t, bt+1 is in the date t information set. An
equilibrium sequence of values of per-capita debt must satisfy the equation,
bt = (pi + n)βpiwt(S)Ψ(bt+1), (43)
b1 = b, (44)
where the function Ψ(bt+1) is defined by integrating the right hand side of Equation
(45) over future uncertainty.
Ψ(bt+1) =
∫ [
bt+1
piw′ + (1− βpi)nbt+1
]
dF (w′). (45)
The following lemma provides an expression of bt+1 as a function of the endowment
wt and the current level of debt bt.
Lemma 1. There exists an increasing function f(x) : [−∞, b∗] → [−∞,+∞] with
b∗ = (pi + n)βpi/(1− βpi)n,4 and the following properties
(i) f(0) = 0,
(ii) limx→b∗ f(x) = +∞,
(iii) limx→−∞ f(x) = −∞.
4Note that if we consider a bounded support [w, w¯] for the distribution F (w), the upper bound b∗
becomes (pi + n)βpiw/(1− βpi)n and we get limw→0 b∗ = 0. In order to be able to consider positive
values for b and to simplify the formulation, we have normalized the lower bound w to 1.
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(iv) Any bounded sequence of debt that satisfies the equation
bt+1 = f
(
bt
wt
)
, (46)
for b1 = b is an equilibrium.
Proof : Applying the inverse function theorem allows us to invert Equation (43)
and to derive the result.
Figure 3. Stochastic Equilibrium in the Samuelson Case
Figure 4. Stochastic Equilibrium in the Classical Case
Using this lemma we state the characteristics of an equilibrium for this economy
in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3. (i) If the economy is Samuelson, there exists a number b1L ∈ (0, b∗)
and an initial debt level b¯ such that if 0 < b < b1L, the policy of rolling over the debt
can be supported as an equilibrium in which debt follows Equation (46) and
lim
t→∞
Prob(bt > 0)→ 0. (47)
If b ∈ [−∞, 0] ∪ [b1L,+∞], the policy of rolling over debt cannot be supported as an
equilibrium.
(ii) If the economy is Classical, there exist numbers b1L and b1U where −∞ < b1L <
b1U < 0, and an initial debt b˜ such that if −∞ < b˜ < 0 the policy of rolling over
the debt can be supported as an equilibrium in which debt follows Equation (46).
Further, there exists an invariant measure φ(x) such that
lim
t→∞
Prob(b1U < bt < b
1L)→
∫ b1L
b1U
φ(x)dx. (48)
If b˜ > 0, the policy of rolling over debt cannot be supported as an equilibrium.
Proof. The dynamic equation of debt as given by Equation (46) is a Markov process.
(i) Consider first the Samuelson case in which this Markov process is defined over
the interval [0, b∗]. As shown in Figure 3, there exists a number b1L ∈ (0, b∗) as
defined by b1L = f(b1L/w¯), such that if b ∈ [0, b1L), f(b/w) remains bounded for each
w ∈ [1, w¯]. Following Futia (1982), this Markov process defines a Markov operator T
on the Banach space of bounded functions on the interval [0, b1L] as
Th(b) ≡
∫
h(f(b/w))dF (w)
The proof is then based on various Definitions and Theorems provided in Futia (1982).
It follows from Theorem 4.6 and Proposition 4.4 that T is a weakly compact operator,
and hence quasi-compact. Moreover, f(b/w) maps the interval [0, b1L] into itself for
each w ∈ [1, w¯]. It follows from Definition 2.1 that T is a stable operator which is
thus equicontinuous as shown by Theorem 3.3. We can then conclude from Theorem
2.9 that there exists a degenerate invariant distribution such that limt→∞ Prob(bt >
0)→ 0 since f ′(0) < 1 for any w ∈ [1, w¯].
(ii) Consider now the Classical case. As shown in Figure 4, there exists a number
b1L as defined by b1L = f(b1L) such that the Markov process (46) is defined over
the bounded interval [b1L, 0]. Following Futia (1982), this Markov process defines a
Markov operator T on the Banach space of bounded functions on the interval [b1L, 0]
as
Th(b) ≡
∫
h(f(b/w))dF (w)
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The proof is again based on various Definitions and Theorems provided in Futia
(1982). It follows from Theorem 4.6 and Proposition 4.4 that T is a weakly compact
operator, and hence quasi-compact. Moreover, we derive from Definition 2.1 that since
f(b/w) maps the interval [b1L, 0] into itself for each w ∈ [1, w¯], T is a stable operator
which is thus equicontinuous as shown by Theorem 3.3. We can then conclude from
Theorem 2.9 that an invariant distribution φ(x) exists and is defined over the subset
[b1L, b1U ] with b1U such that b1U = f(b1U/w¯). To conclude the proof, we need finally to
consider the case in which the initial debt is such that b˜ < b1L. Since f ′(b/w) < 1 for
any b ∈ (−∞, b1L) and w ∈ [1, w¯], we get bt+1 = f(bt/wt) < bt for any bt ∈ (−∞, b1L)
and wt ∈ [1, w¯]. As a result, there exists τ > 0 such that for any t > τ , bt ∈ (b1L, 0)
and the previous argument applies.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.
X. Stochastic Dynamics: the Case of Money
There is a second case of interest in which bt is denominated in units of account.
This is what Samuelson (1958) called money. David Gale has analyzed the dynamics
of the non-stochastic two-period model and Farmer andWoodford (1997) have studied
a stochastic version of it. Our perpetual youth model behaves very much like the
stochastic two-period case studied by Farmer and Woodford.
When bt is denominated in nominal units, Equation (30) must still hold each period
in a rational-expectation equilibrium. But now there is no initial condition and bt+1
is no longer in the date t information set. It is a random variable that depends on the
realization of the period t+ 1 price level. Consider the following change of variables
xt =
bt
wt
. (49)
Using this new variable we can write Equation (30) as follows,
xt = λ1Et
[
xt+1
pi + λ2xt+1
]
, (50)
where λ1 ≡ (pi + n)βpi and λ2 ≡ (1 − βpi)n. The fact that bt+1 is not in the date t
information set means that we can treat xt+1 as a random variable, determined at
date t + 1. As in Proposition 3, we derive the characteristics of an equilibrium in
terms of debt to endowment ratio.
Proposition 4. (i) If the economy is Samuelson then the number x∗ = λ1−pi
λ2
is positive.
In this case, if the initial debt to endowment ratio satisfies the restriction 0 < x < x∗,
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the policy of rolling over the debt can be supported as an equilibrium in which debt
follows Equation (50) and
lim
t→∞
xt = 0. (51)
If x ∈ [−∞, 0] ∪ [x∗,+∞], the policy of rolling over debt cannot be supported as an
equilibrium.
(ii) If the economy is Classical, then the number x∗ = λ1−pi
λ2
is negative. In this
case, if the initial debt to endowment ratio satisfies the restriction −∞ < x < 0,
the policy of rolling over the debt can be supported as an equilibrium in which debt
follows Equation (50) and
lim
t→∞
xt = x
∗. (52)
If x > 0, the policy of rolling over debt cannot be supported as an equilibrium.
Proof : Applying the inverse function theorem allows us to invert Equation (50)
and to get
xt+1 =
pixt
λ1 − λ2xt
≡ G(xt)
We easily derive that there are two steady states which are solutions of G(x) = x,
namely 0 and x∗ = (λ1 − pi)/λ2. The results follow from the fact that G′(0) = pi/λ1
and G′(x∗) = λ1/pi.
Although xt is non-stochastic in the equilibria described in this proposition, debt
itself is a random variable that fluctuates in proportion to the endowment. Since
the convergent steady states are indeterminate in this proposition, the techniques
discussed in Farmer and Woodford (1997) allow the construction of sunspot equilibria
in the neighborhood of the steady state. For the monetary economy, we can also
support equilibria at the determinate steady states.
Proposition 5. (i) If the economy is Samuelson, and if the initial value of debt is
non-negative, there exists a stochastic golden rule equilibrium in which
xt = x
∗. (53)
(ii) If the economy is Classical, there exists a stochastic autarkic equilibrium in
which
xt = 0. (54)
In the Samuelson case, the price level adjusts each period to keep the ratio of debt
to the endowment constant. In the classical case, existing debt is repudiated by an
instantaneous hyperinflation that wipes it out. In this equilibrium money has no
value.
DEBT, DEFICITS AND FINITE HORIZONS: THE STOCHASTIC CASE 19
XI. Conclusion
We have shown how to solve a discrete time version of the perpetual youth model
by assuming the existence of complete financial markets. Our model provides applied
researchers with a tool to study the effects of fiscal policy without introducing uncer-
tainty in an ad hoc manner. We showed that, when preferences are logarithmic, the
model behaves a lot like a pure-trade version of the two-period overlapping genera-
tions model and, like that model, government debt has important effects on the real
interest rate and on intertemporal allocations. Our solution technique should prove
useful in the analysis of calibrated macroeconomic models that drop the representa-
tive agents assumption, a step that is critical to an assessment of the long term effects
of government debt on employment, output and welfare.
Appendix A
Deriving the Human Wealth Equation. Using Equation (1) and Definitions (14)
and (15),
∑
i∈At
hit(S) =
∑
i∈At
wit(S) +
∑
S′∈S
Qt+1t (S
′)pi
∑
i∈At
hit+1(S
′)
⇔ Ntht(S) = Wt(S) +
∑
S′
Qt+1t (S
′)[Nt+1 − nNt]ht+1(S
′)
⇔ Ntht(S) = Ntwt(S) + pi
∑
S′
Qt+1(S
′)Ntht+1(S
′)
⇔ ht(S) = wt(S) + pi
∑
S′
Qt+1(S
′)ht+1(S
′).
(55)
Line 2 follows from line 1 using the definitions of aggregate wealth and aggregate
human wealth and by recognizing that the human wealth of the old at date t + 1 is
equal to total human wealth Nt+1ht+1 minus the human wealth of the new generation
which has nNt members. Line 3 uses equation (1) to replace (Nt+1 − nNt) by piNt
and the final line follows from canceling Nt.
Deriving the Pricing Kernel. We begin with Equation (11), the agent’s Euler
equation. Aggregating this equation over the set At of agents that are alive at date
t, we obtain the expression
Qt+1t (S
′)
∑
i∈At
cit+1(S
′) = βp(S ′)
∑
i∈At
cit(S). (56)
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We can obtain an expression for the right hand side of this equation in terms of the
aggregate endowment since from market clearing we know that∑
i∈At
cit =
∑
i∈At
wit = Wt. (57)
To find a simple equation that describes equilibrium, we need an expression for∑
i∈At
cit+1(S
′) in terms of the aggregate variables Ht, Wt and Bt. We will use two
facts. First, the consumption of all agents is the same linear function of their wealth.
Second, every aggregate variable can be split into a sum over new born agents and
existing ones.
Using the aggregation definition, Equation (13), and market clearing, it follows
that
Wt+1(S
′) =
∑
i∈At+1
cit+1(S
′) = pi
∑
i∈At
cit+1(S
′) +
∑
i∈Nt+1
cit+1(S
′). (58)
Recall that newborns do not own Arrow securities. Their wealth is in the form of
human wealth. Using the policy function (12) evaluated at date t+ 1 we can find an
expression for newborn consumption in terms of human wealth. Since the number of
newborns at date t+ 1 is nNt, we can write this expression as follows,∑
i∈Nt+1
cit+1(S
′) = (1− βpi)nNtht+1(S
′). (59)
Combining Equations (57), (56), (58) and (59) leads to the expression
Qt+1t (S
′) =
piβp(S ′)Wt(S)
[Wt+1(S ′)− (1− βpi)nNtht+1(S ′)]
. (60)
Dividing top and bottom by Nt gives an expression for Q
t+1
t (S
′) in terms of per
capita variables wt and ht(S).
Qt+1t (S
′) =
piβwt(S)p(S
′)
(pi + n)wt+1(S ′)− (1− βpi)nht+1(S ′)
(61)
which is Equation (23) in the body of the paper. This equation gives the equilibrium
value of the price of an Arrow security.
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